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The Problem 
 
Water is the lifeblood of the desert 
regions of the western states, and it remains 
one of the issues over which political 
battlelines are drawn fastest and firmest. In the 
western states, a system for the capture, 
transportation, and delivery of water provides 
perhaps the most important element of the 
economic infrastructure of the regional 
economy. Over the past century, the combined 
efforts of visionaries in both the public and 
private sectors developed a vast water supply 
network that has allowed for the development 
of a robust economy in an increasingly 
important region of the nation. Today, in many 
areas, the reliability of that water supply 
system is as tenuous as it is important. 
 
Given current levels of water 
development, there is not enough of the 
resource to go around, and everyone- -city 
residents, farmers, environmentalists, and 
recreationists--seems to want more of it. In 
coastal Southern California alone, last year 
natural population growth and net in-migration 
added roughly 400,000 new residents. This 
represents an increase in water demands 
during a single year that exceeds the total 
water demands of the cities of Miami, 
Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, or St. Louis. The 
Metropolitan Water District of Southern 
California (Metropolitan), which provides 
imported water to coastal Southern California, 
estimates that additional reliable supplies of 
more than 500,000 acre-feet (AF) will have to 
be secured for the area by 2000, followed by 
another 500,000 AF during the first decade of 
the 21st century. 
Increasing water demands are by no 
means restricted to western cities. Many 
agricultural areas are seeking additional water 
to relieve groundwater overdraft problems 
and, in some cases, to satisfy unmet irrigation 
demands. More water is also being demanded 
in efforts to preserve the natural environment 
and support freshwater-related recreation and 
tourism activities. 
 
Against this backdrop of intensifying 
competition for water resources, available 
reliable water supplies have dwindled. Urban 
Southern California lost over one half of its 
dependable supply of Colorado River water as 
a result of the Arizona decision of the United 
States Supreme Court. The State Water 
Project (SWP), designed and constructed in 
part to offset this loss of Colorado River 
water, remains incomplete and can deliver 
barely one half of the water for which 
Southern California has contracted. The 
evolving Public Trust Doctrine has 
undermined water rights previously regarded 
as unassailable, such as in the Mono Lake 
basin where the City of Los Angeles could 
lose up to 70,000 AF of water supplies 
annually in order to preserve the environment. 
Finally, the availability of local groundwater 
resources could decline considerably as our 
technical ability to detect chemical 
contaminants in groundwater basins develops 
and public concern over water quality grows. 
 
Water Markets 
 
In this complicated and precarious 
political environment of growing demands 
and dwindling supplies, water transfers or 
“water markets” have 
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evolved as a potential source of additional water 
supplies in the western states. Broadly defined, 
water markets involve the use of economic 
incentives or financial assistance to better 
conserve, manage, or otherwise reduce water 
use in one area so that water can move from 
lower value uses to higher value uses. 
 
In California and the other western states, 
water transfers have been commonplace for 
decades. In the San Joaquin Valley, agricultural 
water agencies have long participated in water 
trading so that available contractual supplies 
could be reallocated from areas of ample supply 
to areas of short supply. Similarly, pumping 
rights have been quantified and marketable since 
the 1940s in adjudicated groundwater basins of 
Southern California. These market-like 
institutional mechanisms for the intrabasin 
allocation of California water are similar to the 
more frequently cited examples of water 
marketing in Colorado and Utah. However, in 
California, as in the other western states, market 
transfers between water basins have been rare 
and raise substantial controversy. 
 
Even so, there is little disagreement that 
water transfers, including major interbasin 
transfers, will be increasingly important as a 
source of additional reliable water supplies. 
Politically, the concept of water markets has 
become an odd common ground around which 
old rivals can gather. The concept receives at 
least some support from the water industry, 
environmentalists, and political leaders alike. 
The real policy question has become 
notwhether, but how, water transfers will evolve 
as a more significant element of water policy in 
the west. And as is the case for most interesting 
policy issues, there is plenty of room for serious 
disagreement on key implementation issues. 
 
Water Transfers in Practice 
 
In recent years, Metropolitan and other 
water agencies in California have made 
considerable progress toward implementing 
water transfer projects. Late in 1988, 
Metropolitan and the Imperial Irrigation District 
(IID) signed a landmark agreement which could 
result in the transfer of 100,000 AF of Colorado 
River water annually from one of the state’s 
largest agricultural agencies to its largest urban 
supplier. Also last year, the United States 
Congress authorized the lining of portions of the 
All-American Canal, a Metropolitan financed 
conservation project which could make 
available to urban Southern California another 
100,000 AF of Colorado River water now 
diverted by agricultural agencies but lost due to 
seepage from the unlined canal. 
 
In the San Joaquin Valley, Metropolitan in 
February, 1989, entered into an interim 
agreement with the Arvin-Edison Water Storage 
District (Arvin-Edison), a large agricultural 
contractor for federal Central Valley Project 
(CVP) water in the San Joaquin Valley. The 
interim agreement is another step toward a long-
term program under development since early 
1986 that will transfer approximately 100,000 
AF of additional water to Southern California 
during future dry periods. In other San Joaquin 
Valley water transfer activities, the City of Los 
Angeles and the Mono Lake Committee, with 
the cooperation of Metropolitan and others, is 
seeking a water transfer from CVP contractors 
to offset water that may be lost by the City in 
order to preserve the Mono Lake environment. 
In addition, the Castaic Lake Water Agency, 
which serves a rapidly growing urban area north 
of Los Angeles, has acquired an option on a 
“water ranch”to transfer 12,000 AF of State 
Water Project agricultural entitlements to urban 
uses. 
 
Ironically, these and other projects at 
various stages of development symbolize not 
only progress toward developing water transfers, 
but also the enormous emotional, technical, 
economic, legal, and political difficulties in 
implementing interbasin water transfers on a 
long-term reliable basis. The fact is that while 
the transfers under development have the 
potential to provide several hundred thousand 
acre-feet of water, none has been completed and 
each faces unique challenges in implementation. 
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In the case of the Metropolitan/IID agreement, 
negotiating teams representing the parties first 
reached agreement in 1985 after nearly two 
years of negotiation. However, because of the 
high degree of controversy and raw emotion 
regarding the project among residents of the 
Imperial Valley, the 1985 agreement 
unraveled. The next three years witnessed on-
again-off-again negotiations punctuated by 
disagreements regarding the applicable legal 
“rules of the game.” In 1988, the California 
State Water Resources Control Board 
(SWRCB) ruled that the water being lost in the 
valley was not being applied beneficially, and 
ordered IID to conserve 100,000 AF annually 
by the mid 1990s. The two parties finally 
singed the water conservation agreement in 
December, 1988, approximately five years 
after negotiations began. 
 
Shortly after the signing ceremony, the 
Coachella Valley Water District (Coachella) 
filed suit contending that it has first priority to 
use water made available by Metropolitan-
financed conservation activities. Palo Verde 
Irrigation District (PVID), the other major 
agricultural water user of Colorado River 
water in California, may elect to withhold 
formal approval of the agreement, a strategy 
apparently intended to preserve future legal 
options. At the time of this writing, 
discussions with both agencies are underway. 
 
Metropolitan and Arvin-Edison reached 
agreement on the basic terms for long-term 
water transfer program after a relatively short 
nine months of negotiation in 1986. This 
project would allow Metropolitan to divert 
CVP surface supplies from the San Joaquin 
Valley that would otherwise be available to 
Arvin-Edison during dry years. In exchange, 
Metropolitan would store SWP water during 
wet years in the groundwater basins beneath 
Arvin-Edison and make this water available as 
a substitute supply to Arvin-Edison farmers. 
 
Within weeks of reaching an agreement 
in principle, Metropolitan and Arvin-Edison 
had their hands full contending with a variety 
of agencies, many with legitimate concerns 
about the impacts of the program. Most 
notably, the other State Water Contractors, 
who along with Metropolitan have contractual 
rights to SWP water, expressed concerns that 
under certain conditions Metropolitan’s 
increased utilization of SWP water in the 
Arvin-Edison program could reduce the 
availability of entitlement water to them. 
During a one-year feasibility study, the project 
was redesigned to avoid this impact (with 
corresponding increase in estimated project 
costs of $4 million). 
 
More recently, the SWRCB has indicated 
that it may require modification of place-of-
use permits to recognize the delivery of CVP 
water to Southern California -- a precedent long 
opposed by numerous CVP contractors in the 
Central Valley of California. Because 
Metropolitan provides a substitute 
groundwater supply for the water it receives 
from Arvin-Edison, the parties have argued 
that on-net no federal water is being received 
by Southern California and they may seek 
legislation to avoid the permit change. 
Negotiators for the would-be transferors note 
that they are barely halfway through what 
appears to be a six year process and that, 
despite recent progress, much work remains 
before the transfer provides an assured supply. 
  
 Metropolitan has also negotiated directly 
with landowners in an attempt to develop “dry 
year options” under which irrigated acreage 
would be reduced during dry years to make 
more water available to Southern California. 
However, in California individual landowners 
generally do not “own” their water, but rather 
have only the right to apply water for 
beneficial purposes, such as irrigating crops. 
In most cases, the actual contract or diversion 
right is held by a public agency, such as an 
irrigation district. This means that while the 
landowner may have control over actions that 
could make water available for urban areas, he 
does not control the right to transfer that water 
to others. Consequently, even in those cases 
where an agreement can be reached with 
individual landowners, the irrigation district 
may 
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cases where an agreement can be reached with 
individual landowners, the irrigation district 
may oppose the transfer because of local 
concerns over third party impacts or 
disagreements among participating and 
nonparticipating landowners. 
 
Water Transfers in the Future 
 
The future political evolution of water 
transfers will be shaped by how we address the 
potential third party impacts and other 
controversies associated with transfers. In 
California, water transfers could evolve in 
several different directions. 
 
California could follow what might be 
termed the “Arizona Model” of water markets. 
In Arizona, where natural water supplies 
relative to demands are considerably lower 
than in California, virtually all water transfers 
activity has been in the form of urban areas 
purchasing “water farms” with the intent of 
eventually retiring the land from production 
and transferring water to the cities. Under the 
policy direction established by the 
Groundwater Management Act of 1980, 
Arizona has chosen an approach to water 
transfers that emphasizes the development of 
its urban economy with a correspondingly 
higher potential for third party impacts in rural 
areas. While no water has yet changed hands, 
the potential for urban/rural conflict is 
evidenced by the numerous bills introduced by 
representatives of rural Arizona to restrict 
transfers now under consideration by the state 
legislature. 
 
Although California has made no policy 
decision comparable to that in the 1980 Act, 
water transfers nevertheless will continue to 
evolve in the state, but along a different path. 
In California, the acquisition of “water farms” 
has been rare and accounts for a very small 
fraction of the water involved in ongoing 
transfer activities. Proposals to reduce 
agricultural production as a means of making 
water available, especially during dry years, 
will likely occur in the future. However, 
California is evolving a model of water 
transfers that emphasizes more conservation 
and better water management in rural areas. 
The Metropolitan/LID agreement will not 
affect agricultural production in the Imperial 
Valley, but will improve the efficiency of on-
farm water management and the distribution 
system that delivers water to farmers. Within 
the Arvin-Edison Water Storage District, the 
only impact on landowners of the agreement 
with Metropolitan will be in the form of 
reduced groundwater pumping costs because 
of higher water table levels resulting from the 
program. 
 
The relative emphasis in the emerging 
“California Model” of water markets on 
conservation and water management rather 
than on reduced production has the potential 
for strengthening not only the urban economy 
but the rural economy of the state as well. If it 
lives up to this political potential, urban/rural 
cooperation could pave the way to 
considerable water transfer activity in the 
future. 
